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The human frame being what it is, heart, body and brain all mixed together,
and not contained in separate compartments as they will be no doubt in
another million years, a good dinner is of great importance to good talk.
One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined well. The
lamp in the spine does not light on beef and prunes.
- Virginia Woolf,
A Room of One's Own1
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all
black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all
Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government
may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be.
- Justice William 0. Douglas,
dissenting in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis2
I. INTRODUCTION
The fierce defense of a private right to discriminate in club member-
ship, exemplified by Justice Douglas' Moose Lodge opinion,' is one of the
glories and contradictions of our constitutional system; and, as Virginia
Woolf deftly observes,4 exercise of the right even in a seemingly benign
form imposes real harm on those excluded. The paradigm case that I
will be discussing grows out of the controversy that may occur when a
private organization or association, which might loosely be called a
"club," excludes from membership certain people because of their racial,
ethnic, sexual,5 or religious identity. The legal and human problems
presented by such a case involve a conflict between the interest in being
treated equally and the interest in being free to choose one's own per-
sonal relationships. Converted to a clash of rights, under federal6 or
state7 law, the paradigm case becomes a collision between a right to be
1. V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 18 (1929).
2. 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972).
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. By "sexual" I am referring primarily to a person's male or female identity, but clubs that
exclude persons who are homosexuals or heterosexuals would certainly come within the subject.
6. See infra notes 107-38.
7. See infra note 43.
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PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
free from discrimination' and a "right to discriminate" stemming from
freedom of association. 9
Litigation spawned by the controversy over private club discrimina-
tion has occurred frequently in recent years.10 The Supreme Court of the
United States has decided three such cases since 1984: Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,1 1 Board of Directors v. Rotary Club 12 and New York State
Club Association v. City of New York.13 All three of these Supreme Court
cases involved a private club's exclusion of women and a law arguably
prohibiting that exclusion. The Jaycees case involved the desire of the
Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters to admit women contrary to the na-
tional bylaws of the United States Jaycees. The national organization
was charged with violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which
prohibited discrimination by places of public accommodation on the ba-
sis of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or sex. 14 The
Rotary case also stemmed from an intraorganizational dispute which re-
sulted when a local Rotary Club admitted three women to membership
allegedly in violation of the Rotary constitution.15 The case was decided
in California under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibited "busi-
ness establishments" from discriminating on the basis of sex, race, color,
religion, ancestry, or national origin.16 The Club Association case in-
volved a facial attack on the constitutionality of a provision of New York
City's Human Rights Law. That law prohibited discrimination by places
of public accommodation on the basis of race, creed, color, national ori-
8. The Court has clearly recognized the equal protection clause as a guarantee of freedom
from discrimination. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880).
9. See infra notes 81-131, 166-71. Literature on the freedom of association is extensive. See
Douglas, The Right of Associations, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1963); Emerson, Freedom of Associa-
tion, 74 YALE LJ. (1964); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Karst,
The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Marshall, Discrimination and the
Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 68 (1986); and Raggi, Individual Right to Freedom of Associ-
ation, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 1 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club,
806 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987); United States Jaycees v. Cedar
Rapids Jaycees, 754 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1985); Tiger Inn v. Edwards, 636 F. Supp. 787 (D.N.J. 1986);
Rogers v. Int'l Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
I1. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
12. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
13. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
14. 468 U.S. at 614-16.
15. 481 U.S. at 541-42.
16. Id. at 541 n.2.
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gin, sex, or handicap and specifically provided that an exemption in favor
of "distinctly private" operations did not apply to a club that has "more
than 400 members," provides regular meal service, and "regularly re-
ceives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or
beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the
furtherance of trade or business." 7 In each of the cases, the Court rec-
ognized the possibility that the club might justify its discriminatory ex-
clusion on the basis of its members' rights to either freedom of intimate
association or freedom of association to enhance the freedom of speech or
the free exercise of religion. But, in each of the three cases, the Court
found either that the associational right had not been established or that
it had been overridden by the state's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination.
Even though the essence of these cases is a conflict between two inter-
ests of constitutional magnitude, 8 a unanimous Supreme Court has sup-
ported each result. The Court has not, however, achieved unanimity of
opinion. In the Jaycees case, then Justice Rehnquist concurred only in
the judgment.1  Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment in the
Rotary case,' ° and, in the Club Association case, Scalia concurred par-
tially in the majority opinion and concurred in the judgment.2' Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in Jaycees that included a strong
disagreement with part of the majority opinion,22 and, in the Club Associ-
ation case, joined by Justice Kennedy, she wrote a more moderate con-
currence.23 In addition, two Justices did not participate in two of the
cases.
24
II. SHELLEY V KRAEMER AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
It is impossible to talk about the constitutional problems raised by pri-
17. 108 S. Ct. at 2229-31.
18. Although both rights are of constitutional "magnitude," the antidiscrimination right has
been characteristically based on legislation. Compare notes 25-80 and accompanying text, infra
(Shelley and post-Shelley analysis) with notes 81-142 and accompanying text, infra (analysis of recent
cases).
19. 468 U.S. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
20. 481 U.S. at 550 (Scalia, J., concurring).
21. 108 S.Ct. at 2238 (Scalia, J., concurring).
22. 468 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. 108 S.Ct. at 2237-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, both of whom were former members of the
Jaycees, did not participate in the Jaycees case, which came out of Minnesota. Justices Blackmun
and O'Connor did not participate in the Rotary case.
[V"ol. 67:815
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vate club discrimination without harking back to Shelley v. Kraemer.25
Although Shelley v. Kraemer does not itself figure prominently in resolv-
ing the interrelated constitutionml issues involved, Shelley nevertheless
casts a silent shadow across the discussion. Shelley's silent shadow,
moreover, points back still further to the Civil Rights Cases.
26
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court, reflecting the mood of the post-
Reconstruction era in which it decided the cases, read the fourteenth
amendment narrowly and the pre-Civil War states' fights bias of the fed-
eral system broadly. The Civil Rights Cases established two important
propositions. First, the Court decided that "public" accommodations
did not entail the "state action" needed to bring the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibitions into play. Instead, the Court found public accommo-
dations to be "private" activities despite the fact that such
accommodations were typically open to the public, served a public pur-
pose, and operated under state license or other authority.2 7 Second, the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases decided that, under section five of the
fourteenth amendment, which authorized legislation "to enforce" the
"provisions of this article," Congress had no power to regulate private
activity that was not itself considered "state action" by section one.28
Together, these two propositions comprise the primary lesson of the Civil
Rights Cases, and that primary lesson continues to be learned to this day.
In fact, the Civil Rights Cases contain language suggesting that Congress'
power might be greater if Congress determined that states were not ade-
quately protecting citizens from discriminatory treatment.29 Moreover,
in connection with civil rights developments of the last generation, a sig-
nificant opinion has emerged both on30 and off 11 the Supreme Court that
Congress has power to regulate private conduct when appropriate to
remedy or prevent violations of the fourteenth amendment by state agen-
25. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
26. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
27. Id. at 10-1 1, 18-19.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 12-15.
30. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
31. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1475
(1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONTITUTIONAL LAW 351-52 (2d ed. 1988); Brest, The Federal Gov-
ernment's Power to Protect Negroes and Civil Rights Workers Against Privately Inflicted Harm, I
HARV. C.R. - C.L.L. REV. 22 (1966); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 8 HARV. L. REV. 91
(1966). See also 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982) (Civil Rights Act of 1968); S. RPr. No. 721, 90th Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. OF ADMIN. NEWS 1840, 1843 (legislative history for 18
U.S.C. § 245).
1989]
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cies. But these qualifying views have never ripened into a Supreme Court
holding; therefore, the second proposition of the Civil Rights Cases con-
tinues to raise a serious question about the power of Congress to act
against private club discrimination on the basis of the fourteenth amend-
ment.32 The Civil Rights Cases thus seem to give private club discrimina-
tion an outer barrier of immunity from constitutional constraint.
It is at this juncture that Shelley v. Kraemer- or, more correctly, what
Shelley v. Kraemer might have been-becomes relevant. One might
think of Shelley as having had the potential to do for the antidiscrimina-
tion interest something comparable to what the Civil Rights Cases did for
the right-to-discriminate interest. During the relatively brief period
when Shelley was causing an uproar in the legal academic community,33
it seemed to stand for the proposition that judicial enforcement of racial
discrimination by a private club-no matter how small, intimate, selec-
tive, or socially oriented the club was in its operations-would be state
action in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.34 But, in contrast to the robustness of the Civil Rights
Cases, Shelley proved incapable of sustaining this seemingly far-reaching
proposition. Indeed, one might say that that was the whole point about
Shelley: the reason that it created an uproar in the first place was that
the logic of Shelley required a sweepingly broad antidiscrimination result,
but that result always lacked a certain credibility."
Had Shelley been read to follow its apparent logic, it would have swept
32. See S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 12-14, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2366-68; S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 42-62, 82-92;
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. Ist Sess. 100, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2355, 2467; 110 CONG. REC. 5959, 6080, 6536-37, 7051-54, 7385, 7401-04, 7753-54, 8083-99, 8709,
9130, 10,370, 12,699-700, 13,334-76, 13,802-03, 13,921-26, 14,183-86 (1964); Report of the Commit-
tee on Commerce, United States Senate on S.1732 to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommoda-
tions Affecting Interstate Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1963).
33. Many of the most important articles dealing with Shelley were published between 1949 and
1964. These include Habor, Notes on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 811
(1964); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notesfor a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962);
Karst & Van AIstyne, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Lewis, The Meaning ofState Action,
60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1949); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judi-
cial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); and Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
34. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 256-60 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. See Karst & Van Alstyne, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 44 (1961).
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aside the real significance of the Civil Rights Cases. 6 Of course, even if
the Court followed the literal line of the Shelley opinion, a realm of po-
tentially permissible private racial discrimination remained. Shelley did
not directly prohibit home owners from covenanting not to sell their
houses to black buyers. Only the judicial enforcement of their agreement
in the event one of the covenantors did not hold the line implicated the
power of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection clause. Similarly, if the private club discriminator kept its dark
work "inside," so to speak, it would avoid the reach of the Constitu-
tion.37  But once it went public-by invoking judicial protection-the
Constitution would step in to limit the implementation of the discrimina-
tion. This step from permissible private discrimination to impermissible
state intervention on the side of discrimination might occur in the private
club context, for instance, if the club attempted to invoke the aid of state
trespass laws to eject a prospective member who was physically present
on the premises and insisted that she was denied membership and a
member's use of club facilities only because of the club's discriminatory
policy. In this situation, it would be argued under Shelley that the state
court's enforcement of the trespass law, invoked by the private club to
implement its policy of discrimination, would not be a neutral act but
would implicate the state in the private club's discrimination.3" Thus,
the state's judicial enforcement of private discrimination would convert
apparent state inaction into action sufficient to bring the fourteenth
amendment into play.39 But the Supreme Court has never extended
Shelley to cover such a trespass action.4°
36. See Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant
Cases, 16 U. CHi. L. REV. 203, 234 (1949).
37. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
38. Shelley might also be invoked, more plausibly today, in cases such as Jaycees and Rotary,
see supra text accompanying notes 14 and 15, in which a national organization is invoking judicial
assistance to force a local affiliated club to abide by a national bylaw requiring discrimination. Cf.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972), holding that Shelley prohibits a state from
enforcing a regulation which had the effect of causing the Moose Lodge to adhere to its own racially
discriminatory rule.
39. See generally Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 481, 484 (1962); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1113-14 (1960);
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1959).
40. In relatively straightforward situations involving an attempt to use trespass laws to enforce
private race discrimination by private restaurants, only Justices Douglas and Goldberg argued that
Shelley prohibited a state court from putting its force behind the private discrimination. Compare
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227 (1964); id. at 286 (Goldberg. J., concurring); id. at 318 (Black,
1989]
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Still, there is probably a distortion in all of this. It ignores the rival
claim of a "right to discriminate." Whether or not the incredulity which
greeted Shelley was prompted by an awareness of this "right," it almost
surely reflected a recognition of an accustomed way of thinking about a
private realm of personal decisionmaking not touched by the fourteenth
amendment's proscription of state discrimination.41 Perhaps they are
moot questions whether the framers meant to constitutionalize this pri-
vate sphere through the state action requirement, whether the early ad-
vent and long life of the Civil Rights Cases have contributed to our bias
toward recognizing such a private liberty, whether our perception of an
entrenched right reflects some more fundamental antecedent value, or
whether some other explanation or explanations influenced our thinking.
At least in retrospect, it seems safe to conclude that this private interest,
easily translatable into a claimed right, was always there to prevent Shel-
ley from converting some subpart of private discrimination into state dis-
crimination. Even under a very strong reading of Shelley v. Kraemer, the
Court might not have treated discrimination by private clubs-or at least
some discrimination by some private clubs-as state action and, thus,
would not hold such discrimination to be prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. 42
III. LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROHIBIT PRIVATE CLUB
DISCRIMINATION
Because of what the Civil Rights Cases did and Shelley v. Kraemer did
not do to the antidiscrimination reach of the fourteenth amendment, dis-
crimination by private clubs is prohibited today if and only if it is prohib-
ited by legislation. Many states prohibit some form of public
accommodation discrimination in a manner which would reach some pri-
vate clubs.43 In addition, Congress clearly has the power to legislate
J., dissenting) with Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J. concurring); Bouie v. Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347, 363 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972), in which the Court denied an injunction to prohibit private club race discrimination in
serving guests and did not discuss the possible relevance of Shelley in the enforcement of the club's
policy.
41. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 573-74 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42. See Henkin, supra note 37, at 487-90.
43. For compilations of state laws prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations see
Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L.
[Vol. 67:815
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against private club discrimination. Congress has prohibited discrimina-
tion based on race or ancestry under section 1981 of the 1866 Recon-
struction Act, which provides that "all persons" shall have the "same
right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens."'  It
has also prohibited discrimination in public accommodations on the basis
of race, religion, and national origin-but not sex4 5-by Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act).4 6
In 1964, Congress skirted the Civil Rights Cases by relying on the com-
merce clause as the constitutional source of power on which to base the
prohibition of private discrimination in the Civil Rights Act, thus avoid-
ing the state action limitation. There was heated controversy over
whether this was the appropriate route to take. It was argued that com-
merce was for cattle, and that the fourteenth amendment was the appro-
priate source of a law aimed at the moral evil of race discrimination. Of
course, the latter course would have required a direct confrontation with
the Civil Rights Cases, leaving the outcome in doubt.4 7 My personal
opinion is that Congress made the correct choice, both because it was the
tactically safer route to vital legislation and because it was in fact a path
that was intellectually and morally respectable. The commerce clause
REV. 55, 56-67 (1979); Project, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and
Federal Public Accommodation Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 250 (1978).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
45. The fact that sex discrimination was not prohibited by the Public Accommodations provi-
sion in 1964 and that the cases now being litigated involve the exclusion of women presumably
reveals a different level of acceptability for private race discrimination and private sex discrimina-
tion. See the confirmation hearings of Justices Kennedy, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
NOMINATION OF ANTHONY M. KENNEDY TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, S. EXEC. REPT. No. 100-13, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (indicating Kennedy
had been a member of the Olympic Club, an exclusive men's club, until November 13, 1987) and
Scalia, Nomination of Judge Antonio Scalia to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Hearings Before the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) (indicating Scalia was formerly a member of the Cosmos Club, an exclusive men's club,
which he defended on the ground that, unlike a racially exclusive club, an all men's or all women's
club did not entail invidious discrimination). The unavailability of accommodations while traveling
has not been historically one of the notable forms of sex discrimination. Thus, it may not be surpris-
ing that sex discrimination in employment was prohibited by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see 42
US.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), but sex discrimination in public accommodations was not. None of the
foregoing, however, should suggest that discrimination against women by public accommodations or
private clubs is acceptable now, nor was accepted by all in 1964. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN,
E. NORTON & S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 1037
(1975); Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HUM. RTS. 1
(1976).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1982) (Public Accommodations).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 32; authorities cited supra note 31.
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suffers much derision because of its elastic availability as a clause for all
reasons. But I find nothing tortured in the reasoning that concludes that
people will be deterred from traveling by the absence of hotel and restau-
rant facilities that will serve them. There was an ample factual record
showing that hotels, motels, and restaurants that would serve blacks
were few in number4"; in the case of establishments providing sleeping
arrangements, fewer would take blacks than would take dogs.49
To say that the commerce clause was a defensible source of power for
legislating against certain kinds of public accommodation discrimination
is not to say that it was the only option. In a surprising evolution of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court discovered in 1968 that section
two of the thirteenth amendment provided a potent power to prevent
discrimination through legislation designed to eliminate "badges and in-
cidents of slavery."' 50  This ruling did not entail a direct revision of the
Civil Rights Cases, although it struck a very different tone concerning the
scope of Congress' power to define badges and incidents of slavery. 51
The Court subsequently used this thirteenth amendment power to justify
the congressional prohibition of racial discrimination in the making of
contracts by private parties, 52 and the Court found that Congress had
exercised that power in enacting section 1981 of the 1866 Reconstruction
Act. 3 The Supreme Court has applied that Act not only to private em-
ployment54 and private education,55 but also to a private swimming
club5 6; there is no obvious reason why this contract principle would not
48. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1946); S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-20, reprinted in
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2372-76, 110 CONG. REC. 7383, 7397-99, 7402-03,
8343 (1964); Report of the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate on S. 1732 to Eliminate
Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-22,
201-204 (1964); A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate
Commerce: Hearings on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 622-34, 692-700, 744, 1383-87 (1964).
49. See 110 CONG. REc. 6532 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
50. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
51. In rejecting the thirteenth amendment as a source of legislative power to prevent racial
discrimination by public accommodations, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases had commented, "it
would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimina-
tion ...." 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
52. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
53. See cases cited supra at note 52.
54. Johnson, 421 U.S. 454.
55. Runyon, 427 U.S. 160.
56. Tillman, 410 U.S. 431.
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cover other types of private clubs as well.57
Race discrimination obviously presents the clearest case for an exercise
of Congress' remedial power under section two of the thirteenth amend-
ment. In recent years, however, the Court has at least implicitly indi-
cated that this thirteenth amendment legislative power to define and
remedy badges and incidents of slavery extends well beyond discrimina-
tion against blacks.5 8 There is no clear stopping point to the logic of this
extension: if Congress has broad power to define badges and incidents of
slavery; if there is no longer any requirement for an actual nexus between
discriminatory treatment that qualifies as a badge or incident of slavery
and membership in a group that was enslaved; if the general approach is
to cover treatment that subjects a group to "slave-like" conditions; if dis-
crimination against other racial and ethnic groups (including white racial
groups!) is within the power; if all of these things are true, as they appear
to be, then there is no evident bar to using the thirteenth amendment
legislative power to proscribe discrimination of any kind.5 9 Nevertheless,
though the logic may not be self-limiting, there may be a limited domain
for logic here as elsewhere. To accept all unequal treatment as slavery is
to destroy the meaning of slavery. To sever the meaning of the thirteenth
amendment from the unique and awful history of race slavery in the
United States and from the post-Civil War black codes that really were
slavelike in their operation would go beyond mere organic growth in con-
stitutional interpretation. While the case for merging sex and race dis-
crimination in the United States may be especially strong,' a political
system that refuses to adopt an equal rights amendment may not be
57. Even if the Supreme Court should reverse these precedents and hold that Congress did not
intend to prevent private contract discrimination by § 1981, that would not affect Congress'power to
enact such legislation. (In Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 57 U.S.L.W. 4705, 4707 (1989), the
Court reasserted its Runyon position that § 1981 applies to private contract discrimination, albeit in
a qualified manner. Of course, a qualification of the Court's statutory interpretation in no way
qualifies the effect of these precedents in establishing Congress' power to enact such legislation.)
58. Without expressly deciding the thirteenth amendment issue the Supreme Court has held
that § 1981 (or its companion, § 1982)-which is generally regarded as a statute enacted under
Congress' thirteenth amendment power-prohibits discrimination against whites (and in favor of
blacks), McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); against persons of Arabian
ancestry, St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2026-28 (1987); and against Jews,
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S.Ct. 2019 (1987). See also Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (indicating that thirteenth amendment protects all "races" from slavery).
59. See Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for
Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1977); Note, The
"New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (1969).
60. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
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ready to accept the former condition of women in this country as slave-
like. At any rate, the conventional wisdom seems to be that the thir-
teenth amendment does not cover sex discrimination,61 and the
conventional wisdom is likely to prevail. The thirteenth amendment,
then, seems a fully adequate power to prevent race discrimination and
race-like discrimination, but it is not a likely candidate as a source of
federal legislative power for preventing private club discrimination on
the basis of sex.62
For still another potential source of congressional power to prevent
private club discrimination, we must return to the lessons of the Civil
Rights Cases. Recall that the second major holding of the Civil Rights
Cases was that Congress' regulatory power under section five of the four-
teenth amendment extends only as far as the state action concept of sec-
tion one allows.63 In short, the ungilded holding of the Civ[l Rights Cases
was that Congress was without power to regulate private conduct. That
Civil Rights Cases lesson continues to be taught. Indeed, its teaching
steered Congress to the commerce clause for unchallengeable authority
to prohibit public accommodations discrimination in 1964, as we have
seen." But contradictory lessons, albeit scanty and disputed ones, have
emerged. 65 In a 1966 case, United States v. Guest,66 one can find a com-
bination of concurring dictum and dissenting "holding" that reveals six
Supreme Court votes directly challenging the correctness of the Civil
Rights Cases on this point.67 According to these six Justices, Congress
clearly has power to regulate private conduct under section five of the
fourteenth amendment when such regulation is reasonably calculated to
further, protect, or enhance the rights guaranteed against state action by
section one of the fourteenth amendment. For example, the Supreme
61. See McAlester v. United Air Lines Inc., 851 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1988); Goff v. Continen-
tal Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982); Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1982);
Bobo v. 1IT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981); Grubb v. Broadcast Music, Inc.,
699 F. Supp. 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Davis v. Devereux Foundation, 644 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Pa.
1986); National Organization for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Conn. 1978).
62. The Supreme Court has cast doubt on Congress' thirteenth amendment power to prevent
national origin discrimination. See St. Francis v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. at 2028 (§ 1981 covers
discrimination based on ancestry but not place of birth).
63. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text.
66. 383 U.S. 747 (1966).
67. 383 U.S. 745, 762 (Clark, J., joined by Black and Fortas, JJ., concurring); id. at 782-84
(Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Court has suggested recently, in justifying state prohibitions of private
club discrimination, that protection from such discrimination contributes
significantly to a person's opportunities to participate in public areas-
where sex discrimination by official acts would be constitutionally pro-
hibited.6 8 On this assumption, Congress might conclude that prohibiting
the private club discrimination was a necessary step in protecting a per-
son's right to enjoy the right to be free of state discrimination. The deli-
cately constructed majority view contained in the various Guest opinions
has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court,69 but it has never been
either definitively confirmed or repudiated.
In another heralded case of 1966, Katzenbach v. Morgan,7" the Court
indicated that, at least in some circumstances, Congress had the power to
"expand," though not to contract,7 1 the bounds of section one of the
fourteenth amendment. That case involved a statute that protected the
right to vote of persons who were only literate in a language other than
English.72 Conceding that, based on judicial interpretations, section one
of the fourteenth amendment would not protect such a right of its own
force, the Court concluded that Congress could restrike the balance of
individual and state interests that had been considered by the Court in
making its constitutional decision. 73 Based on this reevaluation, Con-
gress could find the balance to favor the individual interests even though
the Court had found it to favor the state, so long as the Court could
"perceive a basis" for Congress' different conclusion. 74  The Morgan
principle has been reasserted and seemingly applied in some contexts,"
mentioned in passing in others,76 and severely criticized in still others.7 7
68. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234-35 (1988) (discuss-
ing claimed right of private association to advance public points of view).
69. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423-24 n. 8 (1973); Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971).
70. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
71. 384 U.S. at 651 n. 10. But see id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Professor Tribe has
summarized the various theories concerning the dilution-expansion dilemma. See L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14 (2d ed. 1988).
72. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643. The statute involved specified that eligibility to vote could not be
denied to a person who had been educated through the sixth grade in an American-flag school in a
language other than English on the basis of that person's inability to read English.
73. Id. at 653.
74. Id.
75. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 371 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
76. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982).
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However, the Court has never squarely disowned it.78 By the Court's
own logic, this congressional power to determine substantively the con-
stitutional boundaries would seem to be available to relocate the line sep-
arating state and private action or state action and inaction. Even if the
power is limited to merely marginal expansions of court determined con-
stitutional limits, 79 it would seem to support legislation prohibiting some
discrimination by private clubs. In this fashion, public accommodations,
which, under the first lesson of the Civil Rights Cases, are generally un-
derstood to entail merely private action despite their public nature and
the state's involvement, could be transmuted into state action by act of
Congress. 0
IV. BACKGROUND OF RECENT PRIVATE CLUB
DISCRIMINATION CASES
The current starting point for finding a right to discriminate embedded
in the freedom of association is the majority opinion of Justice Brennan
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.8 But the Court did not invent the
basic ingredients of this analytical framework in the Jaycees case. One
earlier and more general source of this analysis is Professor Wechsler's
Neutral Principles article.82 In regard to the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,"3 Wechsler asked whether there was any
principled way to choose between freedom to associate, which he saw as
77. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 293-96
(1970) (Stewart, J., concurring).
78. In City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), the majority eschewed the substan-
tive power to redefine constitutional rights in favor of a very broad remedial authority, but Justice
Rehnquist in dissent thought that only the Morgan derived substantive power - which he decried
- could explain the majority's result. Id. at 219-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. See Burt, Miranda and Title IL" A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Choper,
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War
Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299, 308-12 (1982).
80. Of course, if the exercise of this power results in legislation that interferes with a constitu-
tionally protected right to freedom of association, it would directly implicate the controversy con-
cerning dilution and expansion of fourteenth amendment rights. See supra note 71. As Professor
Tribe has argued, however, the apparent dilemma concerning expansion and dilution is exaggerated
since a constitutional doctrine that enables Congress to escape apparent limitations on its powers
carries no implication whatsoever that these powers any more than other powers, may override
constitutional prohibitions designed to protect individual rights. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 5-14 (2d ed. 1988).
81. 468 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1984).
82. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
83. 349 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the interest protected by Brown, and freedom not to associate, which he
saw as the interest overridden by Brown. 4 A more pointedly applicable
forerunner of the Jaycees opinion is Professor Henkin's article, Shelley v.
Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion." Henkin argued that some of the
more far-reaching readings of Shelley would infringe upon a fundamental
liberty interest protecting the right not to associate.8 6 Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education 7 is the modem Supreme Court authority for the
proposition that the first amendment includes a right not to associate. In
Abood, the Court reasoned that nonunion workers could not be required
to contribute to a union fund used to pay for political expression. In fact,
the Abood model exemplifies a form of the right not to associate quite
different from the one presented by private club discrimination. In
Abood, nonunion adherents claimed a right not to be forced into un-
wanted membership. In the case of private club discrimination, club
members claim a right to deny membership to unwanted applicants.
More than any of these other authorities, however, Runyon v. Mc-
Crary 88 most fully anticipated the associational right-to-discriminate ap-
proach of the Jaycees opinion. Having found that section 1981
prohibited a private school from denying a student admission on the ba-
sis of race, 9 Runyon addressed the question whether the school had a
constitutional "right to discriminate" that overrode the statutory man-
date.' The Court considered the question under three headings-a right
of parents to control their children's education, a right of privacy, and
the freedom of association. The Court's analysis of the first two of these
rights was not sharply differentiated and was heavily influenced by the
Court's limited view of the parental educational prerogatives under
Pierce v. Society of Sisters9 1 and Meyer v. Nebraska.92 Although the
Court acknowledged the existence of a right of privacy stemming from
Skinner v. Oklahoma,93 Griswold v. Connecticut,94 Loving v. Virginia,95
84. Wechsler, supra note 82, at 33-34.
85. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962).
86. Id. at 487-90.
87. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
88. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
89. Id. at 168-75.
90. Id. at 175-77.
91. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
93, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
94. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Roe v. Wade,9 6 and other cases, it concluded that preventing racial dis-
crimination in private schools "does not represent governmental intru-
sion into the privacy of the home or a similarly intimate setting. '97
The Runyon Court's treatment of freedom of association is of special
interest for its relevance to the private club context. The Court acknowl-
edged the associational right of parents to send their children to schools
"that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable,""8 but the
Court quoted the court of appeals with approval for the proposition that
"there is no showing" that discontinuing the discriminatory admission
policy "would inhibit in any way the teaching" of any ideas or dogmas.9 9
The Court also relied on its own earlier statement in Norwood v. Harri-
son,"°° in which the Court invalidated a textbook loan program as it ap-
plied to private discriminatory schools:
[While i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment ... it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protection. And even
some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in cer-
tain circumstances under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment; Congress
has made such discrimination unlawful in other significant contexts.101
Because the Runyon analysis is so relevant to the issues raised by pri-
vate club discrimination, it deserves careful attention. First, and most
generally, the Court told us that it concedes some substance to this first
amendment claim of a right to associate, but apparently not too much.
A right that is so readily discounted is not likely to provide serious com-
petition for an anti-race discrimination policy, and probably not for an
anti-sex discrimination policy either. The goal of eliminating private
school discrimination seemed easily to justify the infringement of the par-
ents' first amendment association right. The Court did not invoke "strict
scrutiny" or a "compelling state interest" even though, by the time of
Runyon, that was familiar language for explaining why fundamental
96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
97. 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 176.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
101. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470). Actually, the quoted lan-
guage is part of a larger section of the Norwood opinion in which the Court is trying to explain why
textbook loans to private discriminatory schools puts the weight of the state behind the discrimina-
tion even though textbook loans to private religious schools do not amount to support in violation of
the establishment clause. Whether or not the Court's attempted distinction in Norwood is convinc-
ing, the purpose of the language may help to explain why it does not quite work in Runyon.
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rights must yield to a state interest.10 2
Second, it is hard to know what to make of something that is, at once,
"a form" of freedom of association "protected by the First Amendment,"
but not entitled to "affirmative constitutional protection." We are, of
course, not talking about any sort of positive liberty in Isaiah Berlin's
terminology.10 3 Rather, we are talking about good old-fashioned nega-
tive liberty: the protection of constitutionally protected freedom from
government interference. The rest of the Norwood quotation, indicating
that "some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legisla-
tion in certain circumstances,"" is a bit cryptic but seems to be making
the unremarkable claim that any right-including a right to discrimi-
nate-may be infringed for a good enough reason. This would seem,
again, to demand that the Court tell us that the reason is good enough
here, and that, following the conventional analysis, there is not a less
restrictive alternative for achieving it.
Finally, the assertion that forcing a school to admit black children will
"in no way" inhibit the school's intended message that racial integration
is bad proves too much to swallow. Just as government-mandated school
segregation conveys a powerful message that black people are unworthy
to associate with whites, 10 5 state-mandated integration conveys a power-
ful message that blacks and whites are human beings with equal worth
and dignity. That message must blunt any merely verbal message, taught
in the school, that segregation is a good thing. Furthermore, unless the
prohibition of racial discrimination by the private school is to be sub-
verted significantly by the attitude of the school toward the black chil-
dren admitted, the ban on discrimination in admission policy must be
accompanied by some requirement that all students be treated on an
equal basis. That, in turn, means that certain types of hostile messages
by the school must be prohibited too.'0 6 All of this adds up to a conclu-
sion that a decision favoring the interest of nondiscrimination over the
102. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976) (speech and association); Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 625-630 (1969) (equal protection); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406-409 (1963) (free exercise of religion).
103. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (1969).
104. 413 U.S. at 470.
105. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
106. See Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 448
F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971) (school under desegregation decree ordered not to display Confederate
flag). But see Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972) (student disciplined for walking
out of voluntary pep rally at school under desegregation decree in protest of playing of "Dixie").
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interest of free association undermines the underlying expressive interest
far more substantially than the Court was willing to concede. Naturally,
that does not mean that the result is wrong, only that the collision of
rights is greater and the implications of the Court's decision more far-
reaching than the Court will acknowledge.
V. PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
In the Jaycees case and its sequels, Rotary and Club Association, we
can see the rearticulation of much of the Runyon analysis. The Court
acknowledged the associational rights on which a right to discriminate
might be based. It subdivided these associational rights into two types
for careful elaboration-intimate association 10 7 and association to fur-
ther first amendment expressive or religious rights.108 In the end, the
Court found these rights only tenuously implicated and easily over-
whelmed by the weight of the antidiscrimination interest furthered by the
legislative provisions involved.
In sharp contrast to Runyon, in which the Court offhandedly dis-
missed privacy arguments as not involving "the privacy of the home or a
similarly intimate setting,"' 0 9 the Court in Jaycees and its successors
treated seriously the potential right of intimate association. In each of
the three cases, as in Runyon, the Court found the actual claim based on
the right of intimate association weak and inadequate-the organizations
involved were too large, too commercially oriented, and too permissive in
their admission policies and operational practices." ° There were hints,
nevertheless, of closer cases to come. In Jaycees, Justice Brennan left us
in doubt as to how broadly he conceives this right to form and preserve
"certain kinds of highly personal relationships" that require "a substan-
tial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State."' It I
107. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see also New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988); Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537, 544-45 (1987).
108. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622; see also Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548-49.
109. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 178.
110. In Jaycees, the Minneapolis Chapter of Jaycees had 430 members and the St. Paul Chapter
had 400. Testimony at the state administrative hearing indicated sex and age were the only reasons
for denial of membership. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 621. In Rotary, club membership ranged from 20
to 900 members. Rotary not only had no membership requirements other than a tie to business, but
it carried out its operation in public. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 340-41. In the Club Ass'n opinion, the
Court stated that each and every club could not be assumed to be intimate enough to survive a facial
challenge. See Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
111. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618.
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He relied on the family-oriented privacy decisions, as Runyon had, but he
characterized the precedents in terms of "personal affiliations that exem-
plify" the relevant considerations-relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in beginning and maintaining the affiliation, and seclusion
from others-and that "suggest some relevant limitations" on the rela-
tionships entitled to constitutional protection. I" 2 Brennan appeared to
avoid carefully any suggestion that family and home represent the outer
boundary of the right:
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of human relationships
that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from
particular incursions by the State. Determining the limits of state authority
.. entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective char-
acteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most atten-
uated of personal attachments." 1 3
Of course it is quite possible that Justice Brennan was merely contem-
plating the protection of these rights in contexts other than their collision
with antidiscrimination interests. There is, in any event, language in the
Court's opinion, building on the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, that suggests that members of the Kiwanis Club, which, unlike
the Jaycees, employs selective membership criteria, might have a consti-
tutionally protected right to discriminate that would shield them from
state regulation.14 Contrary to this suggestion, Justice Powell in his Ro-
tary opinion for the Court denied any implicit approval of the Jaycees-
Kiwanis distinction." 5 Powell furthermore put off for another day "the
extent to which the First Amendment protects the right of individuals to
associate in the many clubs and other entities with selective membership
that are found throughout the country."'" 6 In her concurring opinion in
Jaycees, Justice O'Connor said, "[w]hatever the precise scope of the
rights" recognized in the marriage, procreation, and family relationships
cases, they do not "encompass associational rights of a 295,000-member
112, Id. at 619.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 620 (citing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Runyon), and 630.
115. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547 n.6. Without reaching the constitutional issue, courts have
permitted Kiwanis clubs to exclude women, on the ground that they were not public accommoda-
tions. These decisions existed both before (Kiwanis of Great Neck v. Board of Trustees, 41 N.Y.
1034, 363 N.E. 2d 1378, 395 N.Y.S. 633 (1977)) and after (Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis
Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d. Cir. 1986)) the Supreme Court's Jaycees decision.
116. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547 n.6. Only Justice Powell has characterized the right of intimate
association as a first amendment right.
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organization ... ... But, in the Club Association case, Justice
O'Connor specifically anticipated a different result:
In a city as large and diverse as New York City, there surely will be organi-
zations that fall within the potential reach of Local Law 63 and yet are
deserving of constitutional protection. For example, in such a large city a
club with over 400 members may still be relatively intimate in nature, so
that a constitutional right to control membership takes precedence.' 1 8
In his short separate opinion in Club Association, on the other hand,
Justice Scalia pointedly stated that the Court "assumes for purposes of its
analysis, but does not hold, the existence of a constitutional right of pri-
vate association for other than expressive or religious purposes." 119
Scalia's characterization of the majority opinion seems accurate. Justice
White, responding only to a facial attack on the New York City law,
said:
[I]t may well be that a considerable amount of private or intimate associa-
tion occurs in such a setting, as is also true in many restaurants and other
places of public accommodation, but that fact alone does not afford the
entity as a whole any constitutional immunity to practice discrimination
.... Although there may be clubs that would be entitled to constitutional
protection .... surely it cannot be said that ... [the law] infringes the
private associational rights of each and every club covered by it.'20
Following the pattern set by Runyon, none of the three recent cases
found any violation of the expressive dimension of the associational right.
In two respects, however, the Court has not followed the lead of Runyon.
First, it has conceded, generally, that requiring an organization to accept
members it would choose to exclude is a prima facie violation of their
right not to associate. The Court fully recognized that coercing accept-
ance of members is a potentially powerful means of impairing the right of
the individuals who choose to associate with each other in expressing
"only those views that brought them together."'' Second, the Court
upheld the statute in overriding this right on the specific grounds that the
statute achieves a compelling interest in eliminating sex discrimination
by the least restrictive means. 122
117. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 631.
118. Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2237. Only Justice O'Connor seems to have taken the position
that a larger organization is more likely to be intimate because it is located in a larger city.
119. Id. at 2238.
120. Id. at 2233-34.
121. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
122. Id. at 628.
[Vol. 67:815
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/10
PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis echoed Runyon in minimizing the
actual impact on the association's expressive activities. Recognizing that
the Jaycees do engage in political expression,12 a the Court refused to con-
cede that the admission of women to membership would have any neces-
sary effect on positions taken or agendas pursued. 124 The Court reached
this conclusion on the basis of one primary argument and one
subordinate argument. The primary argument was that nothing "in the
record" supported the view that the women's positions would be differ-
ent, 125 and the Court refused to indulge in the stereotypical assumption
that there is a correlation between sex and point of view. 126 The conclu-
sion that women would not undermine the male-oriented program of ex-
pression that would otherwise prevail also was reinforced somewhat on
the distinct basis that the Jaycees already permitted nonmember female
participation in its activities in various respects. 1 27 There is an uncon-
vincing glibness in the Court's lofty disdain for any suggestion that there
might be significant differences in the content of discussion that would
take place in all-male and sex-integrated groups. Moreover, it appears to
be facially inconsistent with a substantial body of feminist literature. 128
Nevertheless, in the setting of the Jaycees organization, the Court's mini-
mization of any characteristically male and female points of view is not
marred by the disingenuity of the Runyon opinion. Although one articu-
lated purpose of the Jaycees is (or perhaps was) to promote the views of
young men, 129 there is nothing in the organization's structure or activi-
ties-as there is in a racially segregated school-that makes admission of
the previously excluded group a strong and inevitable contravention of
the view that the organization was partly organized to promote.
The Jaycees position concerning expressive association is repeated in
the Rotary and Club Association opinions. In all of these cases, there is
the implicit indication, as stated by Justice White in Club Association,
that:
it is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it
is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to
123. Id. at 626.
124. Id. at 627.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 628.
127. Id. at 613.
128. See V. SACKVILLE-WEST, ALL PASSION SPENT 152-66 (1983); Rhode, Association and As-
similation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 119-20 (1986).
129. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 612-13.
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advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its
membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same
religion.
1 3 0
In none of these cases, however, does the Court tell us what the result
would be under those facts.1 3
1
In her Jaycees concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor strongly attacked
this entire approach: "Whether an association is or is not constitution-
ally protected in the selection of its membership should not depend on
what the association says or why its members say it."'1 32 But Justice
O'Connor herself asserted that she has a "more fundamental" disagree-
ment with the majority's approach to expressive association.,33  She
would draw a distinction between commercial and expressive associa-
tions, giving little protection to the former and nearly absolute protection
to the latter.'34 She advanced this position in full recognition that draw-
ing such a bright line will not always be easy.135 Nevertheless, she be-
lieved that the need for a clear line is imperative, and she thought that it
is particularly justified because the organizations themselves decide
which route they will take.136 O'Connor apparently held to this position
in her concurring opinion in the Club Association case, when she said,
"Predominately commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a
First Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from the
antidiscrimination provisions triggered by the law."'137 Somewhat more
ambiguously, she added, "There may well be organizations whose ex-
130. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988).
131. See infra notes 172-200 and accompanying text.
132. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 633-34. There is some apparent tension between the O'Connor position and both the
commercial speech doctrine and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), but
there need not be a fatal inconsistency. with respect to commercial speech, Justice O'Connor may
be saying simply that the low level of protection to which commercial speech is entitled would never
be adequate to overcome the state's overriding interest in preventing invidious discrimination by
private clubs. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (government may regulate commercial speech to further an interest less important
than a compelling interest). As to First National Bank, Justice O'Connor could be saying that com-
mercial organizations are not presumptively engaged in the political speech activity that entitles an
association to prophylactic protection; of course, if the association does advance a political position,
that communication would be protected under First National Bank, 435 U.S. at 778-83, and nothing
in the O'Connor position would prevent that.
135. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 636.
136. Id. Justice O'Connor would include the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts as expressive activities.
Id.
137. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2237 (1988).
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pressive purposes would be substantially undermined if they were unable
to confine their membership to those of the same sex, race, religion, or
ethnic background, or who share some other such common bond. The
associational rights of such organizations must be respected." '138 Read
straightforwardly, this latter statement seems to endorse the test she crit-
icized in Jaycees: the undermining of expressive purpose in the manner
she described would seem to depend on the particular purpose of the club
and the relationship to that purpose of the views of the excluded mem-
bers. But perhaps she was just saying that, whenever such organizations
have expressive purposes, the possibility of such undermining requires
that they be permitted to discriminate in selecting members as they wish.
Despite the differences, there is obviously a great deal of common
ground between the majority and Justice O'Connor. Commercial pur-
poses may be dispositive for her; they are certainly going to be influential
to the majority. Under the majority analysis, the existence of commer-
cial purposes may make a collision of views between forming and ex-
cluded members less likely. 39 Furthermore, the Court seems to regard
the existence of a commercial purpose as highly important in concluding
that the state has a compelling interest in restricting any associational
rights. The particular amendments to the New York City law challenged
in the Club Association case were based on the specific findings of the
New York City Council that private clubs described by the amendments
were centers of commercial transactions 1'---places where business was
carried out and advantageous professional contacts were made. Evi-
dently the Court also thought that protecting members of excluded
groups from losing commercial advantages was of paramount impor-
tance. In both the Jaycees and Rotary cases, the Court squarely con-
cluded that the state had a compelling interest in preventing these
injuries and that such interest was sufficient to override "some incidental
abridgement" of protected speech'41 or "some slight infringement" of the
right of expressive association. 142
138 Id.
139. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
140. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2230 (1988).
141. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628.
142. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987).
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VI. POSSIBLE FUTURE TREATMENT OF PRIVATE
CLUB DISCRIMINATION.
Speculation about the future treatment of private club discrimination
must begin with the inheritance of the Civil Rights Cases and Shelley v.
Kraemer. In the absence of a radical constitutional change, private clubs
are not prevented from discriminating by the Constitution itself. Recent
Supreme Court decisions have dealt with statutory prohibition of private
club discrimination, but they have left many questions unanswered. In
general, these cases tell us that discrimination in the membership policy
of private clubs will meet one of three possible fates. First, the discrimi-
nation may be prohibited by legislation, but nevertheless protected under
a constitutional right of intimate or expressive association. Second, as in
the three recent Supreme Court cases, the discrimination may be prohib-
ited by legislation and not protected by any constitutional right, either
because no constitutional right exists under the circumstances or because
the right is justifiably restricted to further a compelling state interest.
Third, the particular discrimination may be immunized by a statutory
exemption from a more general legislative prohibition of discrimination.
The succeeding sections, in dealing with these possibilities, treat sepa-
rately the right to intimate association and the right of expressive
association.
A. The Private Club Exemption
The statutory exemption is likely to occupy a pivotal role in the treat-
ment of private club discrimination. Under the unvarying pattern of
modern public accommodation legislation, an exemption is carved out in
favor of truly private associations by specific language or interpretative
gloss. 143 For example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts
discrimination by "a private club or other establishment not in fact open
to the public." 1" The New York City law involved in the Club Associa-
tion case exempted from coverage "any institution, club or place of ac-
commodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private."' 145
The Minnesota statute involved in Jaycees applied only to "public" busi-
143. See Bums, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and
the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R. - C.L.L. REV. 321, 377 (1983); Project, Discrimination in
Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 250 (1978).
144. Title II, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1982).
145. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2229 (1988).
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nesses, 14 6 and the California statute involved in Rotary covered only
"business establishments." '147 When there is no explicit exemption, the
courts may nonetheless find that the legislature intended one. In a con-
curring opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, Justice Powell argued that the
Court should read section 198 1's prohibition of private discrimination to
include an implied exception removing a class of intimate private con-
tractual relationships from coverage.148 Justice Powell acknowledged
that the line could not be identified with clarity in the abstract, but he
thought that contractual relationships such as those involved in hiring a
housekeeper or a babysitter were so intimate and personal that the legis-
lature would not have intended to preclude the use of race among the
factors affecting such a decision. 149
These statutory exemptions evidently reflect a policy distinction be-
tween cases in which the private choices of an association should be
honored and cases in which the public nature of the association makes
paramount the state's interest in equal opportunity. The private club ex-
emptions may also be designed to remove from government regulation
those situations most likely to invoke plausible constitutional claims of
an association-based right to discriminate. Furthermore, without regard
to the legislative intent behind these exemptions, the courts will probably
construe them in light of the constitutional right actually or potentially
involved. There is little doubt that the factors considered in applying the
private club statutory exemptions are virtually identical to the factors
identified by the Court as relevant in determining whether a constitu-
tional right of intimate association is involved.150
B. Intimate Association: The Constitutional Right to Discriminate.
The preceding discussion of statutory exemptions is likely to be espe-
cially pertinent to a claimed constitutional right to discriminate based on
the right of intimate association. The recognition of a protected realm of
146. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 616 (1984).
147. Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 557, 541 n.2 (1987).
148. 427 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 188-89. With respect to private school admissions, Justice Powell saw the small
music class or kindergarten on the excluded side and, on the covered side, he saw a commercially
operated school that advertised for and admitted students without restriction except for race.
150. Compare Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Sullivan v. Little Huntington Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) with New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); Board of Directors v. Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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"privacy" or private decisionmaking-including discriminatory decision-
making-underlies both the legislative exemption of some private club
discrimination from antidiscrimination statutes and the judicial creation
of a constitutional right of intimate association. Thus, if the legislative
exemption is broad and the constitutional right of intimate association is
assumed to be narrow, the actual scope (and even the existence) of the
constitutional right will remain undetermined.
The right of intimate association had its first full-blown explication in
Justice Brennan's Jaycees opinion."5 ' Although this opinion portrayed
the right as a potentially broad one, the portrayal was only dictum since
the right was not implicated by the kind of private club involved in that
case. 52 Nor was the right of intimate association implicated in the Ro-
tary case. 153 Furthermore, the Court's consideration of a potentially af-
fected freedom of intimate association in the Club Association opinion
was severely limited by the fact that that case involved only a facial at-
tack on the New York City law. 54 Justice O'Connor, concurring,
opined that there undoubtedly would be instances of intimate association
not protected by the private club exemption in the New York City
law,155 but Justice Scalia skeptically pointed out that the Court "assumes
for purposes of analysis, but does not hold the existence of a constitu-
tional right of private association."15 6
The Jaycees Court constructed the right to intimate association from
the right to privacy cases. Even the narrowest reading of those cases
reveals an associational element-between husbands and wives t5 7 or par-
ents and children. 158 Plainly, the fundamental interests involved in these
family relationships are capable of extension' 5 9 and manifestation in
other contexts, 60 but it can hardly be said that the extension of these
151. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
152. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 621.
153. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 540-41; see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
154. Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
155. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 2238 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
158. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
159. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
160. Cf. United States Dept. ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (regulation requiring food
stamp recipients to be related if living in same household violates equal protection clause),
[Vol. 67:815
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/10
PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
rights has found fertile soil for growth outside the family setting.161
With the family privacy cases as a guide and the Court's Jaycees criteria
as a compass, it may be possible to identify private clubs which are suffi-
ciently small and selective in their choice of members, which have mem-
bers who are sufficiently intimate with each other and participatory in
the club, and which pursue objectives that are sufficiently personal, so-
cial, and noncommercial to qualify for the constitutional right of inti-
mate association. Possibly, even when these criteria of size, intimacy,
and purpose are satisfied only weakly and the private club is located well
down the spectrum from the family, the Constitution will prove generous
in giving the club protection on the basis of the freedom of intimate asso-
ciation. Should a new Moose Lodge case be brought on the basis of an-
tidiscrimination legislation rather than the equal protection clause, 162 we
might learn much about the scope of constitutional immunity for private
clubs claiming to be intimate associations. The Jaycees Court may be
correct in asserting that constitutionally protected intimate associations
may be found at various points along a spectrum, with the family being
merely the paradigmatic extreme case, but that is clearly not yet the law.
C. Intimate Association: The State's Compelling Interest in Prohibiting
Discrimination.
As previously indicated, the associations most likely to qualify for con-
stitutional protection on the basis of their highly personal, highly selec-
tive character are also the associations most likely to fall within a
statutory exemption.1 63 Assuming, however, that an exemption is not
available, the associations with the strongest claim for constitutional pro-
tection based on freedom of intimate association are nevertheless likely to
escape regulation because of the relative weakness of the state's regula-
tory interest in that context. The strongest case for regulation is based
on the connection between membership in the private club and business
and professional opportunities. The Supreme Court prominently empha-
sized the exclusion from the commercial marketplace which operates
within the sanctuary of the private club in Jaycees, Rotary, and Club
Association. I6I Likewise, virtually everyone who has written on the sub-
161. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974).
162. See supra notes 38 and 40 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
164. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988); Board
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ject has stressed the vital link between club membership and both the
transaction of business and the making of contacts. 165 Yet the existence
of commercial activities and objectives is itself a factor leading the courts
to find no right of intimate association at all. Furthermore, the more
selective the club, the more intimate the relationships, and the smaller
the membership, the less likely it is that the private club will be a locus of
commercially relevant activity. Therefore, in the usual case, when the
arguments for recognizing a right of intimate association are at their
peak, the state interest in regulating such an association is likely to be at
its weakest.
In addition to the provision of access to commercial opportunities, the
other primary reason for private club antidiscrimination legislation is the
protection of excluded groups from the stigmatization and indignity re-
sulting from exclusion. If we once again assume that a private club has
the characteristics of size, selectivity, intimacy, and noncommercial pur-
pose entitling it to claim the right of intimate association, it appears that
injury to the individual justifying state regulation will be least severe in
the case where the associational claim is the strongest. Of course, exclu-
sion is often intended or perceived as rejection and so tends to cause
injury to individual dignity, and the likelihood that the exclusion will be
stigmatizing is greatest for excluded groups that are already identified as
traditionally disadvantaged minorities. But this type of injury is substan-
tially reduced when the exclusion results from high selectivity and when
the resulting membership is small and "private." Exclusion is less insult-
ing when it is the norm rather than the exception, when fewer are chosen
than excluded, and when a disfavored basis for selection is used for inclu-
sion rather than exclusion-at least when the basis for selection is nar-
row and coherent, like Irish ancestry, rather than large and amorphous,
like white Christian.
of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537passim (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 628 (1984).
165. See, eg., Bums, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanc-
tum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321 (1983); Linder, Freedom of
Association after Roberts v. Jaycees, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1878 (1984); Marshall, Discrimination and the
Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 68 (1986); Raggi, Individual Right to Freedom of Associa-
tion, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977); Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U.L. REv.
106 (1986); Project, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public
Accommodation Law, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 250 (1978).
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D. Expressive Association: The Constitutional Right to Discriminate.
When the right of a private club to discriminate stems from the consti-
tutional right of intimate association, we have seen that the scope and
existence of the constitutional right is largely unsettled; that antidis-
crimination legislation often exempts private club discrimination that
might otherwise qualify for constitutional protection; and that, for pri-
vate clubs that are sufficiently private and intimate to be entitled to prima
facie constitutional protection, the state is not likely to have a sufficiently
strong justification for restricting the right. When the focus shifts to the
constitutional right of expressive association, very different conclusions
obtain.
The rights of intimate and expressive association diverge sharply with
respect to the relative clarity and stability of each right's existence. The
Supreme Court has recognized a right to freedom of association derived
from freedom of speech for over fifty years.1 66 In contrast to its reluc-
tance to recognize a right of intimate association, in the three recent
cases--Jaycees, Rotary and Club Association -involving private clubs
that excluded women as members, the Court recognized a right of ex-
pressive association. 167
It is probably a truism to observe that the exemptions carved out of
antidiscrimination statutes are not inserted with expressive association in
mind."'68 The statutes involved are basically aimed at preventing discrim-
ination by "public" accommodations or some equivalent public entity,
and the exemptions are intended to draw a line between what is truly
public and what is truly private. In fact, litigation interpreting the pri-
vate club exceptions has involved identifying sham private clubs and de-
nying them the protection that is appropriate for legitimately private
activities. 169 None of this has much to do with clubs that have expressive
166. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
167. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text. Because it was reviewing a facial challenge,
the Court in Club Ass'n had less occasion to develop the right of expressive association.
168. The New York City law considered in Club Ass'n specifically exempted benevolent orders
and religious corporations on the ground that they were in their nature "distinctly private." The
Court concluded that singling out these particular kinds of clubs for advantageous treatment easily
satisfied a rational basis equal protection inquiry. 108 S. Ct. at 2234; id. at 2238 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). But, given the content-based classification involved, it would seem that a stricter scrutiny
should have been applied. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Police Dept. of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
169. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969); Daniel v. Paul 395 U.S.
298, 301 (1969); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.,
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purposes or engage in expressive activities. Of course, such a club might
coincidentally fall within the exemption, but that would not depend upon
the constitutional basis for recognizing a right of expressive association.
The rights of intimate association and expressive association are also
very different in terms of the kinds of considerations that lead to a deter-
mination that a private club is entitled to constitutional protection. The
Court's intimate association criteria are designed to identify an essence:
whether a private club is sufficiently small, selective, intimate in purposes
and activities to be an intimate association. By contrast, a private club
qualifies for protection as an expressive association, not because of what
it is, but because of what it does. Protection for an expressive association
is based on the fact that individuals use the association for expressive
purposes. What the club is like in general, what the character of the club
may be in various respects-indeed, what it does other than engage in
speech activity-is irrelevant. If individuals exchange ideas within the
associational structure or use that structure to disseminate views, the
club has satisfied the justification for recognizing a constitutional right to
associate. The Supreme Court was very clear in Jaycees that state inter-
ference with an expressive association's control of its own membership
directly impacts on the agenda for discussion that the association would
otherwise set for itself, and directly threatens to alter the message that
the association would otherwise communicate:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure
or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the
original members to express only those views that brought them
together. 170
Justice O'Connor said it even more strongly: "Protection of the associa-
tion's right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the
formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the
selection of members is the definition of that voice.",1 7'
E. Expressive Association: The State's Compelling Interest in
Preventing Discrimination.
The differing considerations that qualify for constitutional protection
397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-53 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
United States v. Clarksdale King & Anderson Co., 288 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
170. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
171. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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as an intimate association and as an expressive association are directly
relevant to making a determination whether a state has a sufficiently
compelling interest to prevent discrimination by a private club. With
respect to the right of intimate association, there is a natural intersection
between the state's interest in regulation and a private club's interest in
intimate association. A club's commercial character directly qualifies its
privacy interest and directly implicates the state's regulatory interest.
The more clearly commercial the club, the weaker its claim of right
based on intimate association. At the same time, the more clearly com-
mercial the club, the stronger the state's legitimate ground for protecting
excluded individuals from the disadvantage of lost commercial opportu-
nity. There is no such natural link between a state's antidiscrimination
interest and a private club's interest in expressive association. As a con-
sequence, a private club may have a very strong constitutional claim of
right of expressive association in precisely the same situation in which
the state has a very strong justification to protect excluded individuals
from commercial disadvantage. Thus, the collision forces a choice be-
tween two values that are comparable in magnitude but different in kind.
1. Balancing Interests or Absolute Rule: The Strength of the
Antidiscrimination Principle.
To solve this conflict, the Supreme Court has professed to adopt struc-
tured balancing-the well known "strict scrutiny" test-under which
fundamental individual interests are subject to restriction on the basis of
a compelling state interest furthered in the least restrictive manner. As
we have seen, Justice O'Connor has criticized this test in part for being
insufficiently protective of first amendment interests, and has seemed to
call for absolute protection of a private club's right of expressive associa-
tion.'7 2 In fact, it is arguable that the Court's actual approach is even
less protective of the associational interest than invocation of the compel-
ling interest test would suggest. Contrary to the usual understanding
that this is a highly protective test, there are indications that a state's
antidiscrimination interest will always be compelling enough to prevent a
private club from relying on its right of expressive association to justify
discrimination in admitting members.
A general indication that the state's antidiscrimination interest will al-
ways trump the associational interest comes from several different deci-
172. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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sions and several different opinions, particularly the majority opinion in
the Jaycees case. In the face of both religious and associational first
amendment interests, the Court has consistently upheld state discrimina-
tion bars and rejected first amendment claims, without questioning the
validity of those claims, when a significant economic disadvantage was
attributable to the denial of equal admission.1 73 Furthermore, these
opinions suggest that the antidiscrimination interest is so overwhelming
that the question is not even close. 174
There are also more specific indications in the Jaycees majority opinion
that the antidiscrimination interest will always prevail, with supplemen-
tary support in the Rotary and Club Association opinions. Although the
Jaycees opinion mentions the state's interest in preventing injury to indi-
vidual dignity, 175 its main focus is on the state's interest in preventing
exclusionary policies that denied excluded groups tangible benefits. ' 76 In
Jaycees, the benefits identified were the goods and services which the club
provided its'members- commercial programs, leadership skills, business
contacts and employment promotions. 177 In Rotary, the benefits were
copies of the Rotary magazine and other publications, the Rotary em-
blem, and conferences that taught management and professional tech-
niques. 17 1 In Club Association's facial challenge, the Court simply recited
without comment the findings of the City Council that the New York
City law covered private clubs providing valuable activities of a commer-
cial nature that would be beneficial for full participation in the business
and professional life of the city.' Whether one focuses attention on the
items specified in each individual case or on the category of items men-
tioned in the cases collectively, it seems patent that the real import of the
exclusion is not the particular economic goods to which a member has
access but participation in the mainstream of the commercial world. Se-
curing access to that mainstream is the compelling interest which the
states justifiably further through their antidiscrimination legislation.
173. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); Board of
Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
174. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
175. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625.
176. Id. at 628.
177. Id. at 626.
178. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 543.
179. Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
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But, of course, that interest is going to be present in any case in which
the private clubs are engaged in activities that facilitate economic success
in American society-whatever expressive activities may also occur.
And, of course, it is protecting the opportunity to enter the mainstream,
without regard to race, or sex, or other invidious classifying characteris-
tics, for which there is a strong constitutional consensus.
The conclusion that Jaycees and its progeny may foreshadow an abso-
lute rule in upholding the antidiscrimination interest over the expressive
associational interest is also suggested by the Court's statement that the
legislative prohibition is not aimed "at the suppression of speech." 180
Once again, this description will be true of all antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. Furthermore, it is a reminder that this associational right is deriva-
tive. Expressive association is protected because individuals need to be
able to join together to exercise their freedom of speech more effectively.
Thus, an abridgement of the freedom of association is, indirectly, an
abridgement of the freedom of speech. Nevertheless, restricting associa-
tional freedom by restricting an association's membership policy does
not, as such, prevent either the association itself or its members from
communicating their chosen messages.' 81 In other contexts, associa-
tional freedom has been subjected to regulation in the service of impor-
tant government interests. 82
In pointing out that the regulation was not aimed at suppressing
speech and that the harm of discriminatory membership did not derive
from the communicative impact of the club's expressive activities,183 the
Jaycees opinion conjures up the case of United States v. O'Brien. s4 In
O'Brien, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that, when government reg-
ulations further interests unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
the Court will scrutinize them using a more deferential standard than the
compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test.18 5 In Jaycees, the
Court did not explicitly adopt the O'Brien test nor explicitly eschew the
180. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
181. When intimate association is regulated by barring exclusion of certain members, the regula-
tion directly interferes with the core right involved; it determines that the right of association to
choose one's associates by being admitted prevails over the right of association to choose one's asso-
ciates by excluding. In Jaycees, Justice Brennan refers to the right of intimate association as "an
intrinsic element of personal liberty." 468 U.S. at 620 (emphasis added).
182. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). But see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
183. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628.
184. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
185. Id. at 377.
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compelling interest test. The Jaycees Court went beyond O'Brien, how-
ever, in diminishing the level of first amendment protection by adopting
an absolute rule that expressive activities producing such harms "are en-
titled to no constitutional protection." ' 6
2. Balancing or Absolute Rule: Balancing Possibilities
Despite these strong indications that private clubs will never be able to
defend their discriminatory membership policies on the basis of their
constitutional right of expressive association, they may not be the whole
story. A more accurate predictive conclusion might take the form of a
rebuttable presumption. Ordinarily, the club's interest based on freedom
of expressive association will yield to the state's compelling interest in
preventing discrimination, but under special circumstances, the expres-
sive associational interest may prevail. On the surface, the possibility
that the associational interest would be protected is required by a test
which purports to weigh important values against each other. Moreover,
in concluding that there was no appreciable interference in the Jaycees'
expression, the Court twice referred to the absence of any evidence in
"the record" indicating that admitting women as members would alter
the Jaycees' speech agenda or change the views or positions it advo-
cated.18 7  Borrowing from the suggestion of the Eighth Circuit, the
Court in Jaycees implied that it might have made a difference had the
Jaycees taken positions on issues directly implicating the interests of wo-
men.I" Taken together, these judicial hints may suggest that clubs can
rebut the presumption in favor of the state's compelling antidiscrimina-
tion interest by either an actual evidentiary showing-going beyond
mere statistics'P-that the excluded group has a discrete, identifiable
and different position on some issue of concern to the club, or a showing
that there are issues of concern to the club inherently likely to produce
different positions by current club members and members of a now ex-
cluded group. 9 The Court has displayed this approach to expressive
association in its treatment of legislative rules governing disclosure of
campaign contributions. Without questioning the existence of a possible
interference with first amendment interests, the Court has upheld disclo-
186. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 130 and 138 and accompanying text.
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sure requirements on the ground that the government interest in disclo-
sure was comparatively strong and the likely chilling effect on political
speech comparatively weak.19 But the Court has refused to permit ap-
plication of the disclosure rules in circumstances in which the chilling
effect appeared more severe. 192
A second, more convoluted argument also suggests that Jaycees does
not preclude the use of a real balancing test under which certain expres-
sive association claims might prevail over antidiscrimination interests.
By using rhetoric not fully in harmony with the facts of the case or the
results of the litigation, the Jaycees Court may have left a misleading
impression of what it was actually doing. On the one hand, the Court
stated that "a 'not insubstantial part' of the Jaycees' activities constituted
protected expression"193; the organizations at the national and local
levels "have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues"' 94; and
Jaycees members "regularly engaged in a variety of civic, charitable, lob-
bying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protec-
tion under the First Amendment."'9 5 On the other hand, the Court
concluded that the Jaycees did not show that the antidiscrimination re-
quirements imposed "any serious burdens on the male members' freedom
of expressive association"196; the admission of women cannot be assumed
to entail different views, agendas, or positions'97 ; "expressive activities
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact...
are entitled to no constitutional protection"'; and the state has a com-
pelling interest in preventing "invidious discrimination in the distribu-
tion of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages."' 9 9 In
sum, despite the Court's apparent recognition of the Jaycees' strong ex-
pressive interests the Court found virtually nothing on the Jaycees' side
of the scale; therefore, it appears that any private club legitimately claim-
ing a right of expressive association will meet the same fate.
What feels wrong about all of this is the exaggeration of the potency of
191. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976).
192. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982). See generally
Stone & Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment,
1983 Sup. CT. REV. 583.
193. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626 (quoting the court of appeals).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 627.
198. Id. at 628.
199. Id.
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the Jaycees' speech interests. There is no doubt the Jaycees do engage in
activities protected by the first amendment, and no doubt it would be
difficult to make a sharp distinction between these activities and those of
other clubs whose expressive purposes and activities might be much more
central to their existence. Nevertheless, it seems unavoidable that the
centrality of the club's expressive activities to its existence will influence
the Court's evaluation of the strength of a club's constitutional claim of
the right to exclude unwanted members. The Jaycees case may appear to
say that the antidiscriminaiton interest prevails against the associational
interest no matter how strong the expressive element; it may be better
understood to say that the antidiscrimination interest prevails at least (or
only) when the associational interest in expression is rather weak.
3. An Alternative to Balancing or Absolute Rule:
Subdividing the Club.
The difficult choice between antidiscrimination protection and free-
dom of association might be moderated in some circumstances by per-
mitting clubs to subdivide their functions. The most well established
ground for denying an association the right to select its members is the
elimination of the economic harm that results from excluding disfavored
groups.2°° At the same time, the Jaycees Court recognized the right of
an organization engaged in political speech activity to protect itself
against intrusion by those with views different from existing members.20 1
Thus, it is arguable that a club may be required to admit excluded groups
to pursue commercial advantages, but that it is not necessarily required
to open membership to engage in the club's expressive activities.
In Abood, where the concern was compelled membership rather than
withheld membership, the Court only partially granted the requested re-
lief.20 2 It permitted employees who chose not to join or support a labor
union to refrain from becoming full members and from contributing fi-
nancially to the union's political treasury.20 3 But the Court did not ex-
cuse these employees from contributing the equivalent of dues to the
union's collective bargaining expenses because, in the Court's view, there
were strong justifications for establishing a system of collective bargain-
200. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
201. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627.
202. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241-42 (1977).
203. Id. at 212.
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ing with exclusive representation.2° So, in the context of a private club
that is engaged in expressive and commercially valuable activity, the
Court might accommodate the associational interests of both the already
included members and the applicants who desire access for the advantage
of the economic marketplace by mandating inclusion for only the eco-
nomic benefits, and not for participation in expressive activities. In a
somewhat similar manner, an organization that wishes to engage in polit-
ical lobbying may lose the favored tax treatment for that activity2 °5 ; but
the organization may still divide its activities between two separate, albeit
affiliated, organizations so that it is not forced to sacrifice the advantages
of charitable tax treatment in order to pursue political speech other than
lobbying. 2 6 The private club required to admit members it would other-
wise exclude may also support its argument for subdividing expressive
and economic activities on the ground that neither individuals nor corpo-
rations may be forced to communicate the messages of the government 2 7
or another individual.208
Short of an actual subdivision of the club into two separate parts en-
gaged in two separate kinds of activities, an attempt to sever the club's
expressive activities from its economically oriented activities might un-
dermine the advantages of admission even for purposes of gaining access
to the club's business and professional opportunities. It would not do,
for example, to have a luncheon speaker and to deny a member who was
lunching with a client the right to participate in the question and answer
period. Similarly, it would seem that a member entitled to the privileges
of doing business at lunch would have to be afforded full participation in
the organizational procedure for selecting lunchtime speakers and struc-
turing such talks. On the other hand, if the private club truly does divide
its expressive and commercial activities, the possible injury to the dignity
of persons denied participation in the expressive activities should not pre-
clude the separation. Private clubs having the strongest reasons for ex-
cluding a class of people to preserve the substance of the members' views
will often have views that are hostile or offensive or insulting to the ex-
cluded group. But the offensiveness of the message of an organization,
204. Id. at 224.
205. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
206. Id. at 544; id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
207. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
208. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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such as the Ku Klux Klan to blacks, is not aggravated meaningfully by
denying membership to blacks. Nor would the sense of injury worsen in
the unlikely event that a group, such as the Ku Klux Klan, provided club
facilities for its members to learn business skills or entertain customers
but organized itself in a manner that withheld participation in the formu-
lation of the club's political messages from its black members.
F Minority Private Clubs.
Private clubs which operate on an exclusive basis in favor of some "mi-
nority" group are also subject to general antidiscrimination legislation,
and they could make the same constitutional arguments and be subject to
the same overriding state interests that might warrant constitutional pro-
tection or justify regulation of any other private club. In the context of
excluding whites or males, however, the constitutional arguments would
tend to be stronger and the arguments for regulation weaker. Limiting
membership to members of a small minority is more selective and thus
more likely to satisfy the criteria for intimate association. Similarly,
groups formed to provide support and reinforcement for members who
are generally excluded and disadvantaged in society are more likely to
satisfy criteria concerning intimacy and seclusion. Even when such
groups have business and professional purposes, they may qualify for the
constitutional protection based on intimate association if the club oper-
ates in a manner calculated to provide a buffer against, rather than entry
into, society's mainstream.
Based on parallel considerations, the state may not have a compelling
interest for preventing discrimination by minority private clubs. The
strongest state interest for regulating the associational choices of private
clubs is assuring that excluded group members enjoy equal opportunity
to tangible economic goods and services, including access to the commer-
cial world of clients and contacts. It is safe to conclude that exclusive
minority clubs, in general, will have a less ample supply of goods and
services and a lower level of power and influence to offer. Similarly,
though exclusion on the basis of group membership may always damage
the dignity of excluded individuals, exclusion of majority members by
minority groups is likely to hurt less and to carry none of the stigma-
tizing insult that accompanies exclusion of minorities with its implicit
message of inferiority or unworthiness.
20 9
209. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 374-75 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
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There is little reason to suppose that a claim of minority clubs to a
right of expressive association would be stronger or weaker than the par-
allel claim of majority clubs. Of course, minority groups might have an
especially strong argument in a particular case that admission of majority
group members would significantly impair their messages on particular
issues. But the strength of the argument would depend on the actual set
of messages the club is engaged in advocating. In this respect, the Nation
of Islam would be no more compromised than the Ku Klux Klan.
VII. CONCLUSION
Had Shelley v. Kraemer loomed larger in proscribing private club dis-
crimination, the courts would have had the difficult task of striking a
balance between competing constitutional claims based on equal protec-
tion of the laws and freedom of association. In fact, the actual role of the
courts differs only slightly whenever they must determine whether the
state's interest is weighty enough to justify a restriction of constitutional
associational rights through antidiscrimination laws. Under the actual
development, there is a valuable role for legislative discretion to preserve
a domain of associational freedom for private clubs. Outside this do-
main, the courts are still developing standards to ensure equal access to
commercial opportunity while preserving enough of the bulwark of asso-
ciational freedom to protect the free expression of individual members.
nng and dissenting). See generally R. DWORKIN, Reverse Discrimination in TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 231 (1977).
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